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Perception 
and
reality
by Keith Wilson
Taken at face value, the picture of reality suggested by modern science seems radically opposed to 
the world as we perceive it through our senses. Indeed, it is not uncommon to hear scientists and oth-
ers claim that much of our perceptual experience is a kind of pervasive illusion rather than a faithful 
presentation of various aspects of reality. Following this view, familiar properties such as colour and so-
lidity –  to take just two examples –  do not belong to external objects, but are fictions generated by the 
brain that we mistakenly ascribe to the world around us. The world itself (so the story goes) is colour-
less, flavourless, odourless, and overwhelmingly empty save for the quantum perturbations of matter/
energy that are studied by physicists. But is this a case where science and common sense are genuinely 
at odds, or can philosophy help us resolve the impasse? 
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A r e  C o l o u r s  r e A l ? 
The temptation to think of perceptual experience as a 
kind of illusion arises in part from our susceptibility to illu-
sions in general. Impressed by the possibility of such errors, 
many scientists take much of what we see, hear, touch, taste 
and smell –  what philosophers collectively call perceptual 
experience –  to exist only within our own minds. Take the 
chequerboard figure depicted below. The two spots appear to 
be different shades of orange, one brighter than the other. But 
examine the figure more carefully and you’ll find that both are 
exactly the same colour. (I am using the term colour here to 
include different shades of colour, as well as black, white and 
grey.) Even more surprisingly, the squares that they lie on are 
also precisely the same shade of grey (if you doubt this, cover 
the rest of the figure with your hand or a piece of paper and 
compare them). Given that our senses can be so easily fooled, 
it is but a short step to concluding that all colour experience 
must be illusory, or that colours don’t exist in external objects, 
but only in the minds of perceivers. But such a conclusion 
would be too hasty.
Just because the perceptual system can be fooled in certain 
cases doesn’t mean that it’s inaccurate in all cases. To see 
why, it’s helpful to consider why this illusion works at all. The 
printed chequerboard diagram mimics the appearance of a 
real three-dimensional chequerboard in which a shadow is 
cast by a cylindrical object. Our visual system compensates 
for this apparent darkening in a way that enables us to cor-
rectly judge that the spots and squares are of different colours 
in the three-dimensional case, as they would need to be to 
create this appearance. 
The illusion works not because colour experiences are 
illusory, but because our visual system has evolved to take 
into account lighting and other effects in order to reveal the 
underlying properties of physical objects under a wide range 
of possible circumstances. So far, there is no reason to suppose 
that these properties shouldn’t include the colours of objects 
as well as their shapes, sizes, locations, and so on.
But why think of colours as properties of objects rather 
than simply a matter of which wavelengths of light are 
reflected towards our eyes? To understand the difference, we 
need to consider the phenomenon of colour constancy.
Different wavelengths of light certainly produce different 
colour experiences in us as well as in other creatures (more 
on that below). However, it would be a mistake to simply 
identify colours with light wavelengths. As with the cheq-
uerboard image, our eyes – or rather, our brains based upon 
information from our eyes – adjust for the overall lighting 
of a scene. On a summer’s evening, for example, the light 
reflected into our eyes comes predominantly from the red 
end of the spectrum, whilst full daylight contains more blue. 
Yet provided that there is sufficient light to make out any 
colours at all, objects – say, a white piece of paper –  do not 
appear to change colour from red to blue depending on the 
time of day. Instead, our visual system adjusts for the prevail-
ing lighting conditions to reveal, or at least approximate, the 
actual colour of the object. That is to say, we experience the 
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piece of paper as having a consistent 
colour despite differences in the precise 
mixture of wavelengths that reach our 
eyes at different times of the day. This 
is similar to what happens when you 
adjust a camera’s white balance setting 
to compensate for sunny, cloudy or ar-
tificial lighting conditions, except that 
our brains do this automatically and 
continually in order to reveal the true 
colours of the objects around us.
Again, one might be tempted 
to say that all these corrections and 
adjustments merely show colours to be 
illusory rather than real, but the fact 
that vision is able to reveal the exist-
ence of stable and consistent properties 
that underly these variations suggests 
that there is more to colour than meets 
the eye. 
One explanation for this is that 
colours are light-reflectance profiles. 
That is, they correspond to dispositions 
of objects to reflect certain wavelengths 
of light when placed under suitable il-
lumination. Thus, a ripe tomato has the 
disposition to reflect mainly red light 
waves, whereas a ripe banana reflects 
mainly yellow light (or some combina-
tion of red and green) to produce its 
characteristic yellow appearance. Of 
course, everyone agrees that this is why 
ripe tomatoes look red whilst bananas 
look yellow, but crucially, reflectance 
profiles are properties of external 
physical objects and not of our minds. 
This would suggest that, far from being 
illusory, colours are perfectly objective, 
physical properties of the objects we 
see around us, just as we commonsen-
sically take them to be.
But now we encounter a further 
problem. Our eyes are only sensitive to 
a small fraction of the electromagnetic 
spectrum, of which visible light forms 
just a part. Objects also reflect and 
absorb light from the infrared and ul-
traviolet ends of this spectrum, all the 
way up to radio waves and gamma rays. 
Even worse, all of the colours that we 
are capable of seeing can be created by 
combining varying proportions of red, 
green and blue light, these being the 
primary colours to which trichromat 
human eyes are sensitive.1 This means 
that some reflectance profiles that yield 
different combinations of light waves 
nevertheless appear wholly indistin-
guishable to us.
White light, for example, can be 
produced by mixing just red, green 
and blue light, as occurs on your TV 
or computer screen. Alternatively, it 
can be produced by combining all the 
colours of the rainbow, as present in 
natural sunlight and revealed by shin-
ing the light through a glass prism. 
To a creature that is sensitive to more 
than just three primary colours, each 
of these forms, or metamers, of white 
would look quite different despite ap-
pearing identical to us. Such a creature 
is not just a theoretical possibility. 
Many species, including the humble 
goldfish, are tetrachromats, sensitive to 
four primary colours, and so capable 
of discriminating many more colour 
variations than we do, with some spe-
cies of shrimp having as many as 19 
distinct colour receptors.2
The problem, then, is not that real-
ity contains no colours, but rather that 
it contains too many, both within and 
beyond the range of electromagnetic ra-
diation to which our eyes are sensitive. 
Many of these exotic colours look iden-
tical or are completely invisible to us, 
making our perceptual abilities limited 
at best. Does this mean that the colours 
we are capable of seeing are somehow 
unreal? Not necessarily. To understand 
why, let us consider a different example: 
the notion of solidity. 
I s  s o l I d I t y  A n  I l l u s I o n ? 
It is a scientific commonplace that 
solid objects are not really solid, but 
consist mainly of empty space. That 
is to say, the volume of matter (or 
vibrating loops of energy, depending 
upon which theory you prefer) in any 
given object is vastly exceeded by the 
amount of space between each particle 
at a subatomic level. This is certainly 
a surprising scientific discovery, but 
does it mean, as some scientists sug-
gest, that solidity is an illusion? Well, 
if by solid you mean densely packed 
without any intervening spaces or 
gaps, then yes it is. But whilst this 
meaning of solid is perfectly acceptable 
when it comes to what the philosopher 
J. L. Austin called “familiar medium-Per
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sized dry goods”, science tells us that most objects are not 
like this at the atomic scale. Consequently, when we talk 
about the solidity of familiar objects, such as a piece of 
wood, we must mean something quite different. In this con-
text, solidity picks out the property of being resistant to the 
touch, relatively stable, impermeable, and so on. The surpris-
ing scientific discovery, then, is not that no objects are solid, 
but that solidity at the macroscopic scale (i.e. ordinary so-
lidity) does not coincide with the property of being densely 
packed at subatomic scales. Instead, macroscopic solidity is 
the result of electromagnetic forces acting between particles 
at the surfaces of objects, including our bodies, to repel one 
another. Indeed, without the existence of such forces, most 
physical objects would simply pass through one another.
We have now identified two different properties, each of 
which can be thought of as a kind of solidity. Consequently, 
it makes sense to say both that everyday objects are solid 
(at the macroscopic level) and that they consist of mostly 
empty space (at the microscopic level) without fear of con-
tradiction. The two claims relate to quite different proper-
ties, both of which objects possess at the relevant scale. The 
temptation to say that solidity is an illusion arises from 
our tendency to conflate these two properties, bringing the 
scientific and commonsense views into apparent conflict. In 
practice, however, provided that we are careful about our use 
of language and understand each term in its proper context, 
these two views are perfectly compatible. Solidity, as it is 
ordinarily understood, refers to a real physical property of 
objects –  namely, their ability to repel one another on con-
tact –  and so is not illusory after all. What, if anything, has 
changed is the meaning of the word solidity.
How, then, does this apply in the case of colour? I sug-
gested above that there are many more colours in the world 
than humans are capable of perceiving. But what is meant 
here by colour? If it is the familiar shades of red, blue, yellow, 
and so on, then such exotica do not qualify as colours in 
the ordinary sense. We use the term colour to pick out what 
are colours for us. The existence of light reflectance profiles 
or metamers that yield colour-like 
experiences in other kinds of creatures 
need not require us to suppose that 
our own colour experiences are some-
how illusory any more than the space 
between atomic particles means that 
physical objects lack solidity. 
Rather, human perceptual experi-
ence grants us only partial access to 
the full range of properties that such 
objects possess. That some of these 
properties, like colours, turn out to be 
relatively complex does not make them 
any less real. Instead, the scientific and 
commonsense world views each capture 
different aspects of reality at different 
levels of abstraction or description. Far 
from our perceptual experience being 
illusory, then, as scientists sometimes 
claim, it is the idea that these two levels 
of description are necessarily incompat-
ible or mutually exclusive that is the 
true, more subtle illusion.
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1 Note that the primary colours for light are dif-
ferent to those for paint.
2 There is evidence that some women may be tet-
rachromats, though there is as yet no proof that 
this enables them to perceive additional colours.
“ t h e r e  A r e  m A n y  m o r e  ‘ C o l o u r s ’ 
I n  t h e  w o r l d  t h A n  h u m A n s  A r e 
C A p A b l e  o f  p e r C e I v I n g . ”
